Pope Leo XIV embarks Monday on an 11-day visit to Algeria, Cameroon, Angola and Equatorial Guinea for his first major international trip since becoming pontiff last year.

From dialogue with Islam to peace efforts, inequality and human rights, the US-born pontiff will address a myriad of issues as he covers more than 18,000 kilometres (11,000 miles) across the African continent.

Leo, who took over as head of the world’s 1.4 billion Catholics in May, will make 11 speeches, preside over seven masses and visit a dozen locations during the trip which lasts until April 23.

The 70-year-old’s words and actions, always closely watched, will have even deeper resonance at a time of deep global uncertainty caused by the Middle East war and resulting energy shock.

It will be Leo’s third trip outside Italy, after Turkey and Lebanon last year, and Monaco in March.

Algeria (13-15 April) – Making history

Leo will be the first pope to go to the North African country of Algeria, where Islam is the state religion.

He will visit the Great Mosque of Algiers and meet with President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. He will also meet members of the Augustinian order to which the pontiff belongs, in Annaba, the one-time home of Saint Augustine.

The pope is “a brother who comes to visit his brothers”, Cardinal Jean-Paul Vesco, the archbishop of Algiers, told AFP ahead of the visit.

Leo will pray privately in a chapel dedicated to 19 priests and nuns murdered during Algeria’s 1992-2002 civil war.

Ahead of the visit, three international NGOs called on the pope to raise concerns about the treatment of religious minorities with Algeria’s authorities.

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Cameroon (15-18 April) – Call to peace

A call to peace and reconciliation is expected to dominate the pope’s visit to majority-Christian Cameroon in central Africa, where the English-speaking northwest has been torn apart by nearly a decade of conflict.

The Catholic Church has played a mediating role in the conflict and the centrepiece of Leo’s visit will be a speech and mass in Bamenda, the epicentre of the violence, to be held under heavy security.

Leo will visit some of the Church’s vast network of hospitals, schools and charitable organisations in Cameroon, where about 37 percent of the 30 million inhabitants are Catholic.

And he will meet with President Paul Biya, 93, one of the world’s longest-serving heads of state who has at times faced criticism from senior Cameroonian clergy over his hold on power.

Angola (18-21 April) – Natural resources

The visit to Angola, a former Portuguese colony in southern Africa, will be a chance for Leo to expound on social themes dear to his heart.

The country is rich in oil and minerals but plagued by poverty, and still scarred by a long civil war that ended in 2002.

Leo is expected to emphasise the need for a more equitable distribution of the wealth from natural resources, as well as the fight against corruption.

His presence is eagerly awaited by Angolan Catholics, who make up around 44 percent of the population, but some are less enthusiastic.

“At the societal level, it represents nothing, because millions of dollars will be taken from the state treasury to prepare, without bringing any benefits to our country,” teacher Rosa Kanga, 42, told AFP.

Leo will visit the capital Luanda — where affluent neighbourhoods contrast with vast slums — but also venture outside. He will go to a centuries-old church on a former slave-trafficking route in the village of Muxima, one of the holiest sites in southern Africa.

Equatorial Guinea (21-23 April) – Balancing act

Leo’s visit to Equatorial Guinea, which has been under iron-fisted rule by President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo since 1979, will require a delicate balancing act.

Some 80 percent of the two million inhabitants are Catholic, but Jean-Paul II is the only pope to have visited, almost half a century ago.

Leo will have to tread carefully between trying to support local Catholics and being seen as endorsing the authoritarian government. Many expect him to deliver a message on human rights and social justice.

In Malabo, recently downgraded as the country’s capital by presidential decree, giant photos of the pontiff were displayed across the city ahead of Leo’s arrival, with national television broadcast adverts about the trip on loop.

AFP

A former commander of Operation Safe Haven, Major General Henry Ayoola (rtd), has dismissed claims that Nigerian soldiers purchasing personal military kits is evidence of systemic failure within the armed forces.

His comments come after a viral interview by a former soldier, Rotimi Olamilekan, popularly known as Soja Boi, who alleged that personnel buy uniforms, boots, and bulletproof vests despite low pay.

Ayoola, while appearing as a guest on Channels Television’s breakfast show, Morning Brief on Friday, explained that it is not unusual for personnel to supplement standard-issue equipment with personal purchases.

“The idea of a soldier, out of personal choice, spending money to improve their kit beyond the standard issue should not be a big deal,” he said.

He insisted that such actions do not indicate that authorities are failing in their responsibility to equip troops.

“It does not mean the system is not working. There is a standard kit that the Armed Forces provide, and that has not changed,” Ayoola argued.

According to the former commander, every soldier is entitled to a baseline level of equipment under what is known as a “full-service matching order”.

“There is a minimum standard of kit that every soldier must be given. It is not true to say that authorities are not kitting soldiers,” he added.

Ayoola acknowledged that operational realities sometimes affect the availability of equipment but emphasised that commanders make efforts to optimise resources.

“When equipment is limited, it is rationalised. There is innovation, and sometimes troops make do with what is available,” he explained.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian Army on Tuesday dismissed allegations that its personnel purchase uniforms and protective equipment with personal funds, describing the claims as false and misleading.

“For the avoidance of doubt, no soldier is deployed to an operational theatre without the necessary protective equipment,” a statement from the Acting Director of Army Public Relations, Appolonia Anele, read.

Security Challenges: A Power Struggle
Beyond the controversy over military equipment and uniforms, Ayoola argued that the broader challenge facing Nigeria is often misunderstood and misrepresented.

He maintained that insecurity in the country should not be viewed solely through a military lens but rather as part of a deeper structural issue.

“What we are dealing with in Nigeria is not just a security challenge. The adversary has shaped a narrative that we have come to accept without properly interrogating it,” he said.

According to him, the crisis reflects a wider struggle rooted in power dynamics and competing ideologies.

“The real issue is a political power problem. The Nigerian situation is a local manifestation of a global trend—a clash of civilisations,” Ayoola stated.

He criticised the country’s approach to tackling insecurity, noting that the failure to clearly define the problem has led to ineffective solutions.

“You cannot solve a problem you have not defined. What we have been doing is like cutting branches without uprooting the tree,” he said.

On concerns about troop vulnerability, including ambush incidents, Ayoola pointed to increasing technological support in military operations.

“There has been increased use of ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance—drones to cover flanks and move ahead of troops, which helps minimise ambushes,” he said.

He insisted that while improvements are always needed, the narrative that soldiers are left entirely unequipped is inaccurate.

Ayoola stressed that a lack of consensus on who the country’s true adversaries are continues to undermine national security efforts.

“If we cannot clearly define who the enemy is and what they want, then we will continue chasing shadows,” he warned.

By Ademola Oshodi

Armed groups operating across Nigeria’s northern and western corridors have adapted faster than the structures designed to contain them. They attack within Nigerian territory, withdraw across borders, and return with renewed capacity. This pattern persists because enforcement has often stopped where the threat does not. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration is establishing a different standard. Nigeria will not accept cross-border sanctuary as a condition of its security environment.

This position is best described as the “No Sanctuary Doctrine”. It holds that any territory used to stage or sustain attacks against Nigeria falls within Nigeria’s operational security concern, subject to existing legal frameworks.
Sovereignty is exercised through the protection of citizens and the denial of operational space to hostile actors. Where the threat is transnational, the response must be equally so.

Nigeria already operates within a lawful structure that enables this approach. The Multinational Joint Task Force, established by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and supported by the African Union, provides for coordinated military operations against terrorist groups across Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Its operational design permits cross-border action under agreed command and rules of engagement. Nigeria has maintained a central leadership role within this force since its reconstitution in 2015. The issue is not the absence of authority, but the need for consistent application and clarity about what that authority covers.

Since 2023, disruptions in regional political order have weakened coordination. Coups in parts of the Sahel have affected intelligence sharing and joint patrol structures. Armed groups have used these gaps to expand movement across the tri-border areas. Nigeria has absorbed the consequences through increased pressure on border communities and critical trade routes. The response cannot depend on the restoration of ideal political conditions. It must proceed within the frameworks that remain in force.

The Tinubu administration has reinforced this framework through targeted bilateral arrangements. In August 2024, Nigeria and Niger concluded a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation to reinforce joint responses to security threats. This reflects a standing recognition across the region that insecurity in border areas is shared and must be addressed through coordinated action. These mechanisms are active instruments of defence and will be used as such.

President Tinubu’s engagement with ECOWAS reflects this position. Nigeria has supported the development of a regional standby force for counter-terrorism and restored financial commitments to the bloc, including over N169 billion in community levy payments between January 2023 and July 2024. A functioning regional mechanism requires both authority and funding. Nigeria has acted on both. This leadership has also been evident in moments of political tension within the sub-region, including its response to the attempted coup in the Benin Republic, where Nigeria’s diplomatic and security engagement contributed to stabilising the situation without escalation. This approach reinforces Nigeria’s role as a responsible security anchor in West Africa.

At the continental level, Nigeria has aligned diplomacy with operational capacity. At the African Union summit in February 2025, Nigeria supported the renewal of the Multinational Joint Task Force mandate and the upgrade of the National Counter Terrorism Centre to a Regional Counter Terrorism Centre. Nigeria also entered into a Strategic Sea Lift Services agreement with the African Union to support peace operations, disaster response, and humanitarian logistics. Within this broader continental architecture, there is also scope for deeper South-South collaboration within the region. ECOWAS can further improve its counter-terrorism ecosystem by facilitating cooperation among member states with advanced capabilities, including countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, whose counter-terrorism infrastructure offers practical models for intelligence coordination and response.

This regional approach is reinforced by a set of international partnerships aligned with the same objective. Engagement with the United States through the Joint Working Group supports intelligence sharing, training, and defence coordination. Cooperation with the United Kingdom includes defence collaboration and the development of customs data exchange systems between the Nigeria Customs Service and HM Revenue and Customs to strengthen border monitoring. The Strategic Dialogue Mechanism with Brazil, concluded in June 2025, adds further capacity through defence cooperation in training and intelligence. Together, these partnerships expand Nigeria’s capacity to detect, track, and respond to threats before they materialise within its territory, while complementing regional efforts.

These engagements support a defined operational objective: to deny armed groups sanctuary around Nigeria’s borders. Nigeria will act through the Multinational Joint Task Force, bilateral agreements, and regional mechanisms to ensure that border proximity does not provide protection for armed groups. Cross-border action will be coordinated, intelligence-led, and executed within agreed legal frameworks, supported by deeper intelligence integration with neighbouring states. As this approach develops, there is a growing case within ECOWAS for more integrated data systems across member states. A coordinated framework linking national identity databases, border control systems, and security agencies would enable early identification of persons of interest across jurisdictions and strengthen collective response capacity.

Ultimately, this doctrine does not seek conflict with neighbouring states, but alignment against a shared threat environment. Where cooperation is available, it will be deepened. Where political conditions limit coordination, Nigeria will continue to act within existing agreements to protect its territory and its citizens. Delay in the face of active threats carries measurable costs in lives, displacement, and economic disruption.

The “No Sanctuary Doctrine” establishes a measurable standard for policy execution. It removes ambiguity from Nigeria’s response to cross-border insecurity. It affirms that territorial defence includes the denial of external staging grounds for attacks. It places Nigeria in its established role as the principal security actor within its immediate region.

This posture carries clear operational demands. Political conditions in the Sahel are unstable. Partner states face their own governance pressures. Domestic security challenges also require sustained internal coordination. Efforts to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons remain critical, particularly in addressing the role of illicit arms flows and local manufacturing networks that sustain non-state actors. Strengthening existing institutions responsible for arms control, alongside greater accountability within border communities affected by cross-border insurgent activity, will complement external security efforts and reinforce national stability.
President Tinubu has set this direction. The National Assembly, regional partners, and Nigeria’s security institutions are part of its execution. Its results will determine the stability of Nigeria’s borderlands and the credibility of the state’s most basic responsibility: the protection of its citizens.


-Oshodi is Senior Special Assistant to President Tinubu on International Affairs and Protocol